Uncertainty Plagues India’s Nuclear Ambitions

The nuclear power plans of India are hampered by legal and land challenges; unless the Atomic energy act is reformed, the involvement of the private sector is stalled and the move ahead is unclear.

India's nuclear energy ambitions face significant hurdles due to land acquisition challenges and outdated legal frameworks. The actions India has taken to establish nuclear energy as the foundation of its future energy security and climate action, have been both ambitious and obscure. The expansion of nuclear power in the country is limited by legal and procedural bottlenecks although the country has developed the capacity to conduct the process given the scientific expertise at its disposal and an institutional structure worth envy. At the core of this deadlock is the Atomic Energy Act of 1962 where the central government is granted exclusive control over nuclear activities, which in effect prohibits any participation in the sector by the private sector. This is a structural limitation to scaling of the nuclear infrastructure according to the liberalized energy market that takes place in history on the basis of national security.Alongside these legal limitations is the continued land acquisition challenges, which has stalled or put on hold a number of nuclear projects. Local attitudes, poor pay systems, and system transparency have left the project implementation a very unstable setup. These legal and land related issues create a Catch-22 that is threatening the nuclear aspirations of India when the world is moving towards energy diversification and low carbon. This article is a critical analysis of how law, land and policy in the nuclear sector in India intersect, suggesting that unless land acquisition in the country is specifically reformed by making the Atomic Energy Act more inclusive, and there is more inclusive land acquisition law.

Halfway Covenant and Bottlenecks in India

The nuclear energy programme in India is seen as one of the pillars in the Indian transition towards low-carbon development, energy security, and technological self-reliance. But this vision is increasingly being subjected to legal and procedural bottlenecks that cripple its realization.

Strategic and Energy Goals
The nuclear vision of India is rooted in its ability to deliver net-zero emissions by 2070 and does not rely on coal and oil as the main source of energy. The government aims to increase nuclear capacity to about 100 GW by 2047, with an initial target of about 8 GW, but has made efforts to hasten the implementation of newer technologies under the Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) or Nuclear Energy Mission for Viksit Bharat. This is due to the geopolitical ambitions and national demands to fuel the rising power requirements in a sustainable way.

Legalizing restraint: Atomic Energy Act of 1962
The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 continues to be an obstacle to policy despite its momentum. The Act puts nuclear activity under the control of the government, eliminating the possibility of privately owned reactors and limiting inter-country cooperation. This monopoly dis-incentivizes investment by private investors, reduces innovation and puts India outside the nuclear supply lines of the rest of the world. Even recent efforts to send Requests for Proposals (RFPs) to private players have not succeeded because of impractical expectations and ambiguous laws.

Acquisition of land problems and opposition
The other issue, which is piling up, is land acquisition in nuclear projects. One such project is the Gorakhpur plant that highlights the tension between the state agencies and locals. Such scandals are bigger issues of vague procedures, inappropriate aims of rehabilitation facilities as well as lack of trust in development guided by the government. Other than stalling projects, these bottlenecks also destroy the faith of people in nuclear development.

Need for Policy Reform
In order to unlock the nuclear potential of India, there must be legal reform. Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act have been proposed to enable controlled use of the private sector, capping supplier liability, and to encourage foreign investment. Based on the experience of liberalizing space and renewable industries in India, a kind of hybridized public and private scheme can be the way ahead.

Legal Catches-22

The nuclear energy sector in India is in a legal trap that has hindered innovation and participation in the sector by the private. The very root of this dilemma is the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, which is a law intended to be controlled by states, but now out of step with modern energy requirements.

Past-Bearing and Monopoly
The Atomic Energy Act was enacted to protect national security and control of Government over such highly unstable substance during the era of Cold War. It gives the central government extensive authority to control production, development, and use of atomic energy, such as the power to designate restricted areas and to control the sharing of information and to license operations. Sofar as this centralized model made local sense, in terms of strategic independence and the danger of proliferation, it is currently creating a structural barrier to scaling of nuclear capacity in a liberalized energy market.

Acts of Parliament barring private entry
By the Act, it is illegal to own or operate nuclear power plants by any other entity, except by the central government or its appointed agencies. A minimum of 51% of equity in a government-owned company must be central government-owned to qualify. This legal monopoly has discouraged both domestic and foreign investment in India as the country increasingly needs energy and is technologically prepared to invest in new projects. Attempts to engage the private player have failed based on unrealistic expectations- requesting them to offer land, capital, and construction without ownership.

The Liability and Investment Catch-22
The nuclear liability system of India, i.e., the Act on Civil Liability on Nuclear Damage, 2010, makes the legal problem even more complicated. It puts the suppliers at risk of accidents, contrary to international standards, and this does not encourage foreign cooperation. This, along with the Atomic Energy Act, forms a Catch-22: without ownership rights, private firms cannot invest, and without private capital and expertise, government cannot scale. This is a case of legal rigidity that jeopardizes India's ambition of achieving nuclear power of 100 GW in 2047.

Reformation of the Imperialists and Policy-making
More recent policy debates have suggested that the Atomic Energy Act should be modified such that it could permit controlled plain engagement, particularly within new technology such as so-called Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). These reforms will focus more on safety and innovation, based on the previous experience in India in the space and renewable industries. Without the legal recalibration, India may not be the global leader in clean energy.

Ground level gridlock

The issue of land acquisition is one of the most controversial and tricky obstacles to the development of nuclear power in India. Policy ambitions notwithstanding, ground-level resistance and procedural slowness remain a thorn in the flesh of key infrastructure projects in the country.

History and Law
The process of acquisition of land to build nuclear installations in India is subject to the RFCTLARR Act. The intention of the Act is to strike a balance between the development and the justice of the displaced communities, but the application of the Act in the nuclear sector has been marred by delays, disputed valuations, and poor rehabilitation. In contrast to other sources of energy, nuclear projects need to be situated on large parcels of land with very high safety margins, and thus their acquisition is sensitive, both technically and socially.

The Gorakhpur Incident
A big set-back in this scenario is the Gorakhpur project. It was built in Badopal, Gorakhpur and Kajal Heri village in 2009 and it has covered a total of over 1500 acres of land. The construction began in 2018, although the land acquisition process was completed by 2012, after a long and controversial scenario. Farmers were complaining that they could not receive guaranteed compensation of 50 lakh/acre and government employment opportunities; instead, they received an amount of 34.7 lakh and no promise of government jobs. This deception of their trust led to protests, lawsuits, and violent evictions, and caused the first stage of the project to start in 2029.

Red Tape and Local Unrest
In other proposed nuclear facilities, similar tensions have developed beyond Gorakhpur. Uncertainty is further compounded by the protracted time taken in the site selection and environmental clearance, and geotechnical validation that may take 5-7 years. In most cases, the populations in the immediate vicinity allege radiation risks, loss of agricultural occupation, and poor transparency. Such complaints are compounded by the lack of social consultation and a lack of consistent execution of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities, which are designed to subsidize social costs.

Inclusive and Transparent Acquisition
The gridlock in land acquisition can only be solved using a multi-pronged approach. First, compensation should be equal, prompt, and in accordance with market realities. Second, rehabilitation can-not miss covering items other than money payments, like job, education, and infrastructure. Third, the institutionalization of community involvement should be introduced by means of hearings and redressal of grievances. Based on the lessons learned with renewable energy and infrastructure industries, a participatory form of acquisition might re-establish trust and even shorten the project schedule.

Breaking the Deadlock

In order to realize nuclear potential, the legal and procedural changes are necessary to overcome the crippling nature of state monopoly and land purchase gridlock.

Reform of the Atomic Energy Act
The Atomic Energy act of 1962, according to which the central government has the exclusive right to manage any nuclear activity, is also increasingly considered as obsolete in the light of the liberalised energy market in India. Specialists have proposed specific revisions enabling the controlled entry of the private sector, especially in the areas of new technologies, e.g., Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). It is scalable, cheap and can be installed in remote sites, although their development has to be privately and innovatively funded. An updated legal system would allow licensing formats, joint ventures, and public-private research collaborations and ensure high safety standards.

Reforming Liability Norms
The Civil Liability of Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 in India shifts liability on suppliers in case of accidents as opposed to the international conventions that attribute such liabilities to operators. It is an offer that has scared away foreign suppliers and investors who consider the risk commercially unfeasible. Investor confidence may be restored by a reform to the liability regime to limit supplier exposure and introduce a government-insured pool like the India Nuclear Insurance Pool (INIP) to bring India into consistency with international best practice.

Rebuilding Land Acquisition
The acquisition of land is still a concern. The Nuclear Plant example of Gorakhpur shows that a compensation dispute and insufficient engagement with the community can put timelines down the drain. To make compensation fair, facilitate timely rehabilitation and involve decisions, experts propose to substitute or reform the existing land acquisition system. Such resistance could be minimized through a clear acquisition model undergirded by grievance redressal policies and local employment guarantees, which would help to build trust.

Hybrid Emerging Governance
The space and renewable energy industries of India provide useful examples of how state regulation can be coupled with innovation in the hands of the private sector. The effectiveness of the commercial wing of the ISRO and its solar energy arrangements shows that the hybrid forms of governance are viable. The same should apply to nuclear energy: the same approach with autonomous control agencies, competitive offers, and the transfer of technologies may ensure faster implementation and protect the interests of the population.

Conclusion

The Indian nuclear energy developmental experience is illustrative of a more general conflict between strategic aspiration and institutional inertia. As the nation has both the technical capacity and the policy desire to increase its nuclear presence, embedded legal and procedural barriers will still hamper efforts. The existing form of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, limits the involvement in the industry and innovations of the private sector, not to mention that the acquisition of land is often viewed as an excessive delay and reduces public confidence. To solve these two bottlenecks requires a moderate approach to reform, an approach that would meet national security and economic expediency, one that would meet development targets and social justice. The Indian nuclear potential can only be realized by legal changes that can facilitate a controlled engagement of the private sector and by clear and open land acquisition models. Based on the experience of other industries, a hybridism of governance could be the way to go. Until these reforms are implemented, the Indian case on nuclear will be aspirational and not operational because of a legal framework that no longer represents energy realities in the modern world.