SHANTI BILL from Vajirao & Reddy Institute

SHANTI BILL

• The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Bill, 2025, known as the SHANTI Bill, was passed by Parliament on December 18, 2025.
• The Bill aims to modernise and expand India’s nuclear power sector.
• The government states that the Bill is necessary to achieve 100 GW of nuclear power capacity by 2047.

• Once notified, the SHANTI Bill will replace two major existing laws:
  • The Atomic Energy Act, 1962.
  • The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLNDA).
• By replacing these laws, the SHANTI Bill redraws India’s entire nuclear governance framework.

• The Bill introduces private sector participation in nuclear power operations.
• It changes rules related to:
  • Who can build and operate nuclear plants.
  • How liability is fixed after a nuclear accident.
  • The structure and independence of the nuclear safety regulator.
  • Compensation, penalties, and dispute resolution mechanisms.
• These changes mark the biggest reform in India’s nuclear sector since independence.

• For the first time since Independence, the Bill allows:
  • Private Indian companies
  • Joint ventures
  • Foreign entities permitted by the Central Government
• These entities can build, own, operate, and decommission nuclear power plants.
• Private entities can now participate in:
  • Transport and storage of nuclear fuel.
  • Import and export of nuclear fuel, technology, and equipment.
  • Handling of nuclear minerals and materials.
• Earlier, these activities were restricted only to public sector entities.
• This ends the operational monopoly of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL).

• The Bill does not directly mention foreign direct investment (FDI) in nuclear power.
• It allows participation by “any other person” authorised by the Central Government.
• The government has indicated that foreign equity participation will follow DPIIT and Commerce Ministry guidelines.
• Detailed clarity will be provided through rules and notifications issued later.

• Despite opening the sector, the Bill retains exclusive government control over sensitive activities.
• These include:
  • Enrichment and isotopic separation of nuclear material.
  • Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.
  • Management of high-level radioactive waste.
  • Production and upgradation of heavy water.
• This ensures national security and strategic control.

• All entities involved in nuclear activities must obtain safety approval from the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)
• Safety authorisation is mandatory for:
  • Manufacture, possession, transport, and disposal of radioactive substances.
  • Import and export of nuclear materials.
  • Establishment, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities.

• The SHANTI Bill grants statutory status to the AERB.
• Earlier, the AERB functioned as a subordinate authority under the Department of Atomic Energy.
• In 2012, the CAG highlighted conflicts of interest due to lack of regulatory independence.
• The new law separates regulatory and executive roles, improving autonomy and credibility.

• The Bill establishes an Atomic Energy Redressal Advisory Council.
• The Council will address grievances, facilitate dispute resolution, and review government orders.
• A Nuclear Damage Claims Commission will handle cases involving severe nuclear damage.
• The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity will act as the appellate authority under the law.

• The earlier CLNDA allowed plant operators to seek compensation from suppliers if defective equipment caused an accident.
• The SHANTI Bill removes this provision related to supplier liability for defective equipment.
• Operators can now seek recourse only if:
  • The contract explicitly allows it, or
  • The damage was caused deliberately.
• This change has raised concerns about reduced accountability of equipment suppliers.

• The earlier flat liability cap of ?1,500 crore has been replaced with graded liability limits based on reactor size.
• Private operators must maintain insurance or financial security to cover liability.
• Nuclear installations owned by the Central Government are exempt from mandatory insurance.
• The Centre may create a Nuclear Liability Fund to meet its compensation obligations.

• The SHANTI Bill introduces monetary penalties for less serious violations.
• It also provides for imprisonment in cases of serious offences.
• Earlier nuclear laws did not provide for financial penalties.

• Section 39 allows the Central Government to classify certain nuclear-related information as “restricted”
• Restricted information includes details related to nuclear materials, plant design, operations, and regulatory submissions.
• Section 39 explicitly states that restricted information is outside the scope of the RTI Act, 2005.
• Once classified, such information cannot be requested, appealed, or disclosed under RTI.

• The RTI Act already allows withholding sensitive information related to national security.
• However, RTI exemptions are conditional and reviewable, and allow a public interest override.
• Section 39 removes this framework entirely.
• There is no justification requirement, no appeal mechanism, and no public interest test.
• Activists argue that this weakens transparency and discourages whistleblowing.

• The SHANTI Bill aims to expand nuclear capacity, attract investment, and modernise regulation.
• At the same time, it raises concerns related to accountability, transparency, and public safety.
• The Bill highlights the challenge of balancing national security, private participation, safety, and democratic oversight in a strategic sector.

• As of 2025, India’s nuclear power capacity stands at 18 GW.
• India has set a target of 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047.
• More than 20 nuclear reactors are currently operational, all managed by NPCIL.
• Over a dozen new nuclear projects are in the pipeline.

• The Nuclear Energy Mission was announced in the Union Budget 2025–26.
• The mission focuses on research and development of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).
• India aims to develop at least five indigenously designed SMRs by 2033.
• Key technologies under development include:
  • Bharat Small Reactors (BSRs)
  • Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
  • Molten Salt Reactors
  • High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors

• India’s ambitious capacity targets cannot be met by NPCIL alone due to limited capital and manpower.
• Achieving 100 GW of capacity requires investment of nearly ?15 lakh crore, while Budget 2025–26 allocation is only ?20,000 crore.
• Many NPCIL projects face chronic delays, highlighting execution challenges.
• Private participation can improve project management, EPC efficiency, and technology adoption.
• Weak domestic uranium supply and reliance on imports require broader participation for fuel security.
• Nuclear power is essential for energy security, grid stability, and net-zero 2070 goals.

• The operational independence of the AERB must be reinforced through transparent appointments and financial autonomy.
• Liability caps should be periodically reviewed and indexed to risk and inflation.
• Public trust must be built through transparency in safety audits, accident reporting, and emergency preparedness.
• Clear Centre–State coordination mechanisms are needed for nuclear emergency response.
• Robust frameworks for waste management and plant decommissioning must be established before large-scale private expansion.